

# 1. Brian Efird

# Problem Statement

- Energy markets, energy economics, and the choice of/implementation of policy are impacted by politics and stakeholder interactions (what we call more generally *collective decision-making processes (CDMPs)*).
- Uncertainty around CDMPs creates fundamental challenges to understand and plan for any phenomena related to economics and policy.
- Decisions resulting from a CDMP can thus vary substantially from *a priori* expectations, as well as from most standard models of energy economics.
  - For example, the election of Donald Trump, and his consequent choices, radically changed expectations regarding the Paris Agreement and all U.S. policies.
  - The impact of a CDMP can be separated into two sources of uncertainty:
    - the inclusion of new actors with distinct preferences or other characteristics
    - the complexity and process opacity that a CDMP generates

# Approach

- KAPSARC is a research centre focused on energy economic and policy questions to produce actionable insight for policymakers and decision-makers.
- We utilize multidisciplinary and mixed-method approaches to address uncertainty:
  - expert workshops and interviews, quantitative modelling, qualitative research, fieldwork, alternate sources and measures of data, etc.
- We regularly conduct scenario analysis to evaluate alternate starting assumptions, and sensitivity analysis to evaluate source/analytic/methodological variation.
- For CDMPs, we have developed the [KAPSARC Toolkit for Behavioral Analysis \(KTAB\)](#):
  - to transparently, rigorously, and explicitly model CDMPs in a replicable way
  - to endogenously integrate CDMPs with economic and energy systems models
  - to develop scenarios, for energy market forecasting and other phenomena with the potential for significant political disruption, based on analytic results rather than assumptions

# Results and Feedback

- Explicitly modelling CDMPs enables KAPSARC research to anticipate/evaluate when (and why) expectations of economic models break down in the real world.
- Nonlinear changes to market processes are often the result of CDMPs.
- Senior decision-makers and policymakers have multiple challenges in absorbing sophisticated uncertainty and risk analyses:
  - limited meeting time and bandwidth
  - inundation of analysis and information from multiple sources (e.g. 17 intelligence agencies in the U.S., with redundant in-house intelligence/analytic capabilities)
  - requirement for rapid decisions
- Research output to key stakeholders is best communicated through:
  - small group meetings to share results based on trusted relationships
  - presentations with clear and easily understandable language to a non-technical audience
  - short, concise, and plain language executive summaries with a more extensive backup report

## 2. Kris De Meyer

# Challenging Current Risk Assessment Approaches for Better Climate Policy

- UCL Policy Commission on the Communication of Climate Science
- Aims
  - Identify and fill “underserved” needs in climate communication and policy
  - Lift communication barriers at boundaries between professional communities
- Problem




# Approach

- Workshop (19 Feb.) exploring CCRAR barriers/gaps with
  - Scientists
  - Civil servants
  - Funders & service providers
- Format: facilitated co-production, exploring
  - different perspectives
  - challenges and tensions
  - solutions
  - action planning

# Workshop Results and Feedback

- Diverse set of perspectives, tensions/challenges and potential solutions
- “Usual” tensions (e.g., “user” desire for certainty, impacts are far in future,...)
- Sets of solutions identified



Range of solutions show that responsibilities are fragmented!



# Strategic decision making under uncertainty in defence: Cognition and computation

Our Ref: [DSTL/PUB107324](#)

27<sup>th</sup> Feb 2018, Decision Framing & Uncertainty Network Workshop

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<https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/defence-science-and-technology-laboratory>


# Problem Statement



# Approach


*“How can cognitive work be automated?” but “In what ways and to what extent might technology and software amplify and extend the human ability to engage in cognitive work?” [4 p. 76-77]*

## (Macro)Cognition [4]




## Computation [5]

RDM Process Steps (Lempert et al 2006)




# Insights and inferences



- **Good enough** (decisions and modelling) with **feedback** are required, **not perfection** [4,8]
- Seeking robust **and** adaptive strategies [4, 7, 8]
- Cognition and computation are **complementary** [2] (Human-agent Collective [9])
- **Iterative exploration** is really important to support sensemaking and robust strategies [2, 4, 5]
- Assumes that the capacity to **adapt can be learnt and developed** [7]
- However, the **culture and processes** of institutions and organisations **inhibit** adoption [10, 11]

# Institutional inhibition of abductive reasoning and Macrocognition



Performance improvement =






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- Contradictions
- Connections
- Coincidences
- Curiosity
- Creative desperation

- Standards
- Controls
- Documentation
- Reviews
- Rigor
- Checklists
- Procedures

Source: after "Seeing what others don't"  
Garry Klein (2015)



# Questions

## References and acknowledgements:

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Thanks to: Dr Julie Gore, University of Bath ([j.gore@bath.ac.uk](mailto:j.gore@bath.ac.uk))

### Slide 1

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### Slide 2


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### Slide 3

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# 4. Sunny Modhara

# Uncertainties in Decision Making at Network Rail




By Sunny Modhara

# Network Rail: who are we and what do we do?


Network Rail (NR) is the UK infrastructure operator, managing:

- 20,000 miles of track
- 40,000 bridges
- 2500 stations
- Signalling, power and communications assets and others
- Largest UK purchaser of electricity
- 34,500 employees

Budget value of **£40bn** over 5 years



# Key decisions at Network Rail



## Strategic decisions (up to 40 years)

- Long term cost and performance
- Whole network scenario analysis



## Planning decisions (up to 7 years)

- Asset specific work plan to deliver required outputs
- Optimisation of work along line of route



## Delivery decisions (up to 3 years)

- Maximising the productivity of possessions
- Minimising disruption to passengers and freight operators



## Operational decisions (real time to one month)

- Predicting and preventing failures affecting services
- Detection, diagnostics and prognostics

Network level: What is the sustainable volume of work to deliver the required level of performance?

Uncertainty from situations far into the future e.g. railway usage

Route level: What specific work is required to meet local stakeholder requirements?

Uncertainty in the impacts of work deferrals under funding constraints

Sub-route level: What is the optimum grouping of work to maximise the availability of time and resources?


Uncertainty about the overrunning of work into operation time

Asset/component level: How can sensors be best used to predict failures and change from a reactive strategy to a predictive one?

Uncertainties around asset failure likelihood, mobilisation/response time and restoration time


# Problem Statement

- **Strategic:** Finding an optimised balance between cost, risk and performance across all assets and intervention types
- Several sources of uncertainty exist, complicating the optimisation process e.g.
  - Initial costs and timing of implementation
  - The degradation of assets with age and usage
  - The effectiveness of interventions
  - Non-modelled factors (unknown unknowns)
- To demonstrate a sufficient level of understanding of asset behaviour and associated maintenance costs to the regulator (ORR)




The trade-off between costs, performance and risk

# Approach and Results



- Strategic models used to forecast typical asset lives (costs and volumes) for each asset
- Adjustments to intervention strategy e.g. deferred or premature renewal, based on local knowledge
- Point estimate costs better expressed as distributions
- Currently being tested on a real project: Transpennine Route Upgrade

Costs per option (point estimates)



Distribution of cost difference

Yoker Uncertainty Analysis - Difference in Total NPV Between Option Five and Base Case (3000 Simulations)

